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Coppede: Constitutional Law - Wyoming Upholds a Resident Laborer Preferenc

CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Wyoming Upholds a Resident Laborer Preference Statute. State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1985).
On September 22, 1983, the Converse County prosecuting attorney
charged Roger Antonich with violating section 16-6-203 of the Wyoming
Preference for State Laborers Act.' The Act requires private contractors
working on a public works project to give hiring preference to qualified
Wyoming laborers over nonresident laborers. 2 The prosecutor alleged that
Antonich, as general superintendent of Westgate Construction Company,
fired a Wyoming worker from a public school construction project in order
to hire a nonresident worker.3 The county court dismissed the charge on
the ground that the Wyoming Preference Act violated the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution. The court relied
on recent cases from other jurisdictions striking down similar statutory
preferences for resident laborers.5 In those cases, the courts held such
statutory preferences burdened one of the fundamental privileges pro1. State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60, 61 (Wyo. 1985).
2.

WYO.

STAT.

§ 16-6-203 (1977) provides:

Every person who is charged with the duty of construction, reconstructing,
improving, enlarging, altering or repairing any public works project or improvement for the state or any political subdivision, municipal corporation, or other
governmental unit, shall employ only Wyoming laborers on the project or improvement. Every contract let by any person shall contain a provision requiring that Wyoming labor be used except other laborers may be used when Wyoming laborers are not available for the employment from within the state or
are not qualified to perform the work involved. The state employment office
nearest the proposed contract or construction site shall maintain a list of
laborers classified by skills, who are residents and are available for employment. When the nearest state employment office is unable to provide the requested number of laborers from its own list, it shall immediately contact other
state employment offices and request the names of other available laborers.
Every person required to employ Wyoming laborers shall inform the nearest
state employment office of his employment needs. If the state employment
office certifies that the person's needs for laborers cannot be filled from those
listed as of the date the information is filed, then the person may employ other
than Wyoming laborers.
3. Brief for Appellant at 2, State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1985) [hereinafter
State's Brief].
4.

U.S. CONST.,

art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 provides: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled

to all the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
5. Antonich, 694 P.2d at 62. Antonich, in a motion to dismiss, alleged that the Wyoming
Preference Act also violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. State's
Brief, supra note 3, at 2. Section 202(a)(ii) of the Act is a durational residency requirement
which defines resident as "any person who is a citizen of the United States and has resided
in the State of Wyoming for at least one (1) year immediately preceeding his application
for employment." (emphasis added). As a general rule, state statutes which either infringe
upon a fundamental right or create a suspect classification rarely survive constitutional
scrutiny under the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court has held that durational
residency requirements burden the fundamental right to travel. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969). The Court has also held that alienage is a suspect classification and statutes
which deny legal aliens private employment opportunities are constitutionally impermissi-

ble. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). The Wyoming Preference Act thus presents an obvious challenge under the fourteenth admendment's equal protection clause because it burdens
the fundamental right to travel and because it excludes legal aliens from private employment opportunities in that the Act only permits a U.S. citizen to become a Wyoming resident.
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tected by the6 privileges and immunities clause-the right to pursue a common calling.
On appeal before the Wyoming Supreme Court, the state conceded
that the Wyoming Preference Act burdened a fundamental privilege,7 but
argued that the Act survived constitutional scrutiny because it precisely
addressed the goal of reduced unemployment by preferring the qualified,
resident unemployed on Wyoming public works projects." The Wyoming
Supreme Court reversed the county court's decision and held that the
Preference Act was "narrowly tailored to fit a particular problem identified by the State and therefore [did] not impermissibly infringe the
privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States." 9
According to the court, the Act did not violate the privileges and immunities clause because the state showed that valid reasons existed for
the Act's enactment. More specifically, the court found that the state properly identified the reason for the Act "as the reduction in unemployment
among [Wyoming's] labor force." 10 The court also agreed with the state
that the Act's discrimination against laborers was necessary because
nonresidents could potentially take jobs away from resident laborers on
public works projects."
This ruling makes Wyoming the first jurisdiction in recent years to
uphold a statutory preference for resident laborers employed by private
construction firms.' The court's upholding of the Act appears to be inconsistent, however, with the constitutional standard established by the
United States Supreme Court in Toomer v. Witsell and recently reaffirmed in United Building and Construction Trades Council of Camden
County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden. 4 Before
discussing the constitutionality of the Wyoming Preference Act, it will
be useful to consider the standards by which the Supreme Court and other
jurisdictions have decided the issue of whether such preference statutes
violate the privileges and immunities clause.
BACKGROUND

The modern analysis under the privileges and immunities clause was
articulated by the Supreme Court in Toomer v. Witsell. 5 Prior to Toomer,
6. The right to pursue a common calling generally refers to the right to seek private
employment. See United Building & Construction Trades Council of Camden County and
Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 104 S.Ct. 1020 (1984).
7. State's Brief, supra note 3, at 8. The right to pursue a trade is a privilege protected
under the privileges and immunities clause. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C. Wash.
1823) (No. 3,230).
8. State's Brief supra note 3, at 12.
9. Antonich, 694 P.2d at 60.
10. Id. at 62.
11. Id. at 63.
12. See, e.g., Note, Construction Workers Residency Requirements: A Constitutional
Response, 17 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 461, 465 (1982).
13. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
14. 104 S.Ct. 1020 (1984).
15. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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the Court's approach to challenges under the privileges and immunities
clause involved a case-by-case analysis which focused primarily on whether
the statute at issue burdened a fundamental privilege.1 6 If a statute infringed on such a privilege, then, with few exceptions, the Court would
invalidate it.'7
In Toomer, the Court's analysis shifted away from classifying fundamental privileges to a determination of whether a state had a substantial reason for discriminating against nonresidents.' 8 In Toomer, the Court
examined a South Carolina statute which restricted the ability of
nonresidents to catch shrimp commmercially within the state's three mile
maritime belt.' 9 The challenged statute required nonresidents to pay ten
times more than the resident fee for a commerical shrimp license. 0 The
court regarded commerical fishing as a privilege protected by the
privileges and immunities clause because "it was long ago decided that
one of the privileges which the clause guarantees to citizens of State A
is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with
the citizens of that State."I' South Carolina argued that the statute was
enacted to help conserve the state's shrimp supply and claimed that the
statute's discrimination against nonresidents was necessary because
nonresidents used larger fishing boats. 2 The state also urged that the
higher fee for nonresidents was justified by the greater cost of enforcing
the licensing law against them.23 The Court, however, rejected the state's
arguments and struck down the statute because nothing in the record indicated that nonresidents used larger fishing boats or that the state incurred a greater cost in enforcing the law against them."4 In declaring the
statute unconstitutional, the Court stated that it would be closing its eyes
to reality if it "concluded that there was a reasonable relationship between
the danger represented by non-citizens, as a class, and the severe discrim'25
ination practiced upon them.

The Court will apply the Toomer test whenever a challenged statute
abridges a fundamental privilege.2" The test consists of two parts. First,
the Court must determine whether the state can offer any substantial
reason for the statute's discrimination against nonresidents. Second, the
16. Knox, ProspectiveApplications of the Article IV Privilegesand Immunities Clause
of the United States Constitution, 43 Mo. L. REV. 1, 16 (1978).
17. Id.
18. Note, supra note 12, at 465.
19. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 389.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 396.
22. The statute's impact on nonresidents was swift and dramatic: "The parties stipulated
that in 1946, the year before nonresidents had to pay higher fees than residents, 100 nonresident boats were licensed [in South Carolina] and that in 1947 only 15 such boats were licensed." Id. at 397. Thus, as a measure to prevent excessive trawling, the statute appeared
to be very effective.
23. Id. at 398.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 399.
26. For a list of those privileges protected under the privileges and immunities clause,
see Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
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state must demonstrate "a reasonable relationship between the danger
represented by non-citizens" as a class, and the severe discrimination practiced upon them."2
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the Toomer test in
Mullaney v. Anderson.29 In Mullaney, the Alaska Fishermen's Union
challenged an Alaska statute under which nonresidents were charged ten
times more than residents for a commercial fishing license. In response
to the Unions's claim that the statute violated the privileges and immunities clause, Alaska argued that the higher fee was justified by the
0
higher cost of enforcing the license law against nonresident fishermen.
Even though Alaska showed that ninety percent of its enforcement cost
resulted from collecting fees from nonresidents, the Court invalidated the
statute because the state failed to establish that the fee differential was
closely related to the difference in enforcement costs." The statute
therefore failed the second part of the Toomer test which requires a
reasonable relationship between the danger represented by nonresidents
and the discrimination practiced against them.
In contrast to Mullaney, the Supreme Court in Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Commission of Montana32 upheld a statute which required nonresident hunters to pay as much as twenty-five times more than residents
to hunt elk. 3 The nonresident hunters who brought the suit claimed that
the statute's unequal treatment of them violated the privileges and immunities clause as well as the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause. Montana responded that the higher licensing fee was justified by
the higher cost of elk management which nonresident hunters imposed
upon the state. 4 In examining the statute, the Court refused to apply the
Toomer test because equal access by nonresidents to recreational big game
hunting was not a fundamental privilege protected by the privileges and
immunities clause. 5 Absent a showing to the contrary, the Court rejected
the plaintiff's argument that Montana was required to apply its hunting
laws equally to resident and nonresident alike. Because the Toomer
analysis was inapplicable, the Court did not require the state to show that
the higher nonresident fees were merely compensation for the cost of
3
managing the state's elk program.

6

27. For purposes of analysis under the privileges and immunities clause, the terms citizen

and resident are interchangeable. See Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
28. Id. See also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 526 (1978).
29. 342 U.S. 416 (1952).
30. Id at 418.

31. Id
32. 435 U.S. 371 (1978).
33. Id at 373.
34. Id at 403 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana, 435 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).
36. According to the Court, the Montana law was valid under the equal protection clause
as well because the statute bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective. The
'rational relation to a legitimate state objective" test is the most deferential level of scrutiny
the Court will apply to a statute challenged under the equal protection clause. The Court
has usually applied this standard of review to those statutes which neither burden a fundamental right nor create a suspect classification. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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Immediately following Baldwin, the Supreme Court decided Hicklin
v. Orbeck in which it applied the Toomer test to strike down the 1972
"Alaska Hire" statute.37 Alaska Hire required private employers to hire
residents in preference to nonresidents for all work performed under contracts associated with state oil and gas leases.38 This was the first time
the Court squarely decided the constitutionality of such a preference
statute under the privileges and immunities clause. Alaska argued that
the statute was justified by the state's high rate of unemployment. The
Court responded that even if a state could validly reduce its unemployment by discriminating against nonresidents,"9 Alaska Hire still would
be unconstitutional because the state failed to show that nonresidents40
constituted a "peculiar source of the evil at which the statute was aimed."
Moreover, Alaska Hire's discrimination against nonresidents was not
substantially related to the state's goal of reduced unemployment because
the statutory4preference applied to all Alaskans regardless of their employment status. '
More recently, the Supreme Court reviewed a much narrower statute
in United Building and Construction Trade Council of Camden County
and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden.41 In United
Building, the Court decided the constitutionality of a Camden preference
hiring ordinance which required that at least forty percent of the
employees of contractors working on city works projects be Camden
residents. 43 As a threshold matter, the Court determined that even those
preference statutes which limit their discrimination to public works projects burden a fundamental privilege and thus would be subject to
privileges and immunities scrutiny.44 To justify the ordinance, Camden
contended that it was enacted to help remedy Camden's economic and
social decay. Camden argued that the ordinance's discriminatory effect
on nonresidents was necessary because nonresident laborers were a
peculiar source of the evil in that they "lived off'Camden without living
in Camden." The city implied that most of Camden's construction jobs
were taken by laborers who commuted to Camden from Philadelphia and
the surrounding areas. According to the city, the ordinance's disparate
treatment of nonresidents was reasonably related to Camden's objective
of solving its economic ills. By assuring a certain percentage of jobs to
the city's unemployed, the ordinance would help revive Camden's stagnant economy. 45 Although the city appeared to satisfy both prongs of the
37. Hicklin, 437 U.S. 517 (1978). The full name of the statute was "Local Hire Under
State Leases." ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 38.40.010 to .090 (1977).
38. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 520.
39. According to the Court, the notion that a state could validly reduce its unemployment by requiring private employers to discriminate against nonresidents was an assumption made dubious by Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871).
40. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 526 (citing Toomer v. Witsell 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948)).
41. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 527.
42. 104 S.Ct. 1020 (1984).
43. Id. at 1024.
44. Id. at 1028. The Court considered the pursuit of a common calling to be one of the
most fundamental privileges protected by the clause.
45. Id. at 1030.
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Toomer test, the Supreme Court refused to take judicial notice of
Camden's unemployment related problems. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the New Jersey Supreme Court and ordered it to make the
factual findings necessary to sustain Camden's contentions. The Court
stated that without those findings, it would be impossible to evaluate
Camden's assertion that nonresidents
were a source of the evil at which
46
the ordinance was aimed.

State courts and lower federal courts which have addressed similar
challenges under the privileges and immunities clause have consistently
applied the Toomer test to strike down statutes giving a private employment preference to state residents. In Salla v. County of Monroe, 7 the
New York Court of Appeals applied the Toomer test and struck down a
New York statute which required private contractors working on public
works projects to hire residents in preference to nonresidents. 8 The
Washington Supreme Court struck down a similar preference statute in
Laborers Local Union No. 374 v. Felton Construction.49 In W.C.M. Window Co. Inc., v. Bernardi,5 ° the seventh circuit upheld a district court's
ruling that an Illinois preference statute violated the privileges and immunities clause.
The courts thus far have consistently applied the Toomer test to strike
down state statutes which burdened a fundamental privilege. Wyoming
is the first jurisdiction to have applied this test to uphold such a statute.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

In Antonich the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the Wyoming
Preference Act against a privileges and immunities challenge because it
46. Id.
47. 48 N.Y. 2d 514, 399 N.E.2d 909, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979), cert. denied sub norn.
Abrams v. Salla, 446 U.S. 909 (1980).
48. Id New York argued that the state's high unemployment rate justified the statute.
The court held that New York's unemployment problem did not justify the statute's
discriminatory treatment of nonresidents because there was no evidence indicating that
nonresidents contributed to the state's unemployment problem. The court further explained
that even if the state had produced such evidence the statute still was unconstitutional
because, like Alaska Hire, it failed to prefer the unemployed over the employed. In other
words, the statute was not reasonably related to the state's objective of reduced unemployment. The statute was therefore unconstitutional because it failed to satisfy both parts of
the Toomer test.
49. 98 Wash. 2d 121, 654 P.2d 67 (1982). The State of Washington argued that the statute
was enacted to strengthen the state's economic welfare and that the statutory preference
for resident laborers would strengthen the state's economy by keeping wages from public
works projects within the state. The hiring of nonresidents, the state asserted, would defeat
this goal because they would divert wages out of the state. In applying the Toomer test,
the court found the statute unconstitutional because the state failed to produce evidence
demonstrating that nonresidents would in fact weaken the state's economy by diverting wages
out of the state. The court never reached the second part of the Toomer test, stating that
if the evil was not identified, the statute could "hardly be closely related to eliminating it."
Id. at 129, 654 P.2d at 70-71.
50. 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984). In affirming the district court's ruling, the court emphasized the State's failure to offer any evidence in support of the statute. Id. at 497-98.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol21/iss1/15

6

Coppede: Constitutional Law - Wyoming Upholds a Resident Laborer Preferenc

1986

CASE NOTES

found that the Act met the test outlined in Toomer.5' In applying the test,
the court considered the language of the statute,52 certain assertions made
by the state,53 and judicial precedent."4 The Act prohibited contractors
working on public works projects from hiring nonresident laborers
whenever qualified resident laborers were available for employment. It
required the contractor to inform the nearest employment office of his
employment needs. If that office certified that no employment office in
the state was able to meet the contractor's employment needs, then he
was free to hire nonresidents.
After determining that reduction in the state's unemployment was
a legitimate objective for the statute's enactment, 55 the court concluded
that the state had offered a substantial reason for the statute's discrimination against nonresidents. In other words, the state had shown that
nonresidents were "the evil which the Wyoming Preference Act combats.
,"56 According to the court, the evil which the Act addressed was
that of "a resident remaining unemployed while a nonresident takes a job
on a public works project."5" The court believed that this assertion satisfied
the first part of the Toomer test.
Having accepted the state's identification of nonresidents as the
"evil," the court then only had to find that the Act's discriminatory effect was reasonably related to the danger represented by nonresidents.
For guidance, the court looked to Hicklin, where it easily distinguished
the relatively narrow Wyoming Act from the Alaska Hire statute. Because
the Wyoming Act only applied within the context of public works projects, the court concluded that the Act had a limited impact on nonresidents
and, therefore, its discrimination was reasonably related to reducing the
state's unemployment rate.5"
Thomas' Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice Thomas recognized a basic flaw in the majority's opinion when he expressed doubt that the record adequately supported the
state's assertion that nonresidents were in fact a peculiar source of the
evil. He also recognized that even though the Act's purpose was to reduce
51. Antonich, 694 P.2d at 64.
52. WYO. STAT. § 16-6-203 (1977).
53. Antonich, 694 P.2d at 62.
54. The court relied on Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) and United Building and
Trades Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 104 S.Ct.
1020 (1984).
55. Antonich, 694 P.2d at 62. In United Building the Supreme Court intimated that
unemployment could be a valid reason for discriminating against nonresidents. United
Building, 104 S.Ct. at 1029.
56. Antonich, 694 P.2d at 62.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 64. The court's reasoning on this point was confused. The second prong of
the Toomer test requires that there be a reasonable relationship between the statute's
discriminatory treatment of nonresidents and the evil which they represent. The court,
however, reasoned that the statute satisfied this part of the test merely because the statute
confined its discriminatory impact to public works projects.
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unemployment, the statutory language did not limit the list of qualified
resident laborers to the unemployed. 9 This particular defect has been fatal
to those preference statutes which have come before other courts. 0
Notwithstanding these problems, Justice Thomas concluded that the
Act should be upheld. He reasoned that because the state was acting as
a "market participant" it was "inappropriate to invoke the privileges and
immunities clause to inhibit the state in regards to the Act."6' In the past,
other states have used the market participant argument to defend a particular statute against a commerce clause, but not a privileges and immunities, challenge. This defense usually arises in connection with a state
owned business which treats in-state customers more favorably than out
of state customers. The United States Supreme Court ruled in Reeves v.
Stake" that nothing in the commerce clause prohibits a state from favoring its own residents when it participates in the market as an independent proprietor. Justice Thomas, however, reasoned that the market participant argument was appropriate in Antonich because of the mutually
reinforcing relationship between the commerce clause and the privileges
and immunities clause. 63 Although he did not elaborate, Justice Thomas
was apparently referring to the Fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation wherein both clauses have their common origin." But his reasoning
is inappropriate here in light of United Building, where Justice Rehnquist
inapplicable to a challenge
stated that the market participant defense was
65
under the privileges and immunities clause.
The Unidentified Evil
When Justice Vinson in Toomer said the state must show something
indicating that nonresidents were a peculiar source of the evil at which
the discriminatory statute was aimed, he implied that the state must
establish a connection between the problem identified by the state and
the activity of nonresidents.6 6 This suggests that the state must present
evidence to establish this connection.67 Justice Frankfurter expressed this
more than bald
same thought in Mullaney when he stated that something
66
assertion is required to establish this connection.
59. Antonich, 694 P.2d at 64 (Thomas, C.J., concurring).
60. See Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 527; Salo, 48 N.Y 2d at 523, 399 N.E.2d at 918, 423 N.Y.S.2d
at 882.
61. Antonich, 694 P.2d at 64 (Thomas, C.J., concurring).
62. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
63. Antovich, 694 P.2d at 65 (Thomas, C.J., concurring).
64. See Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 379 (1978).
65. United Building, 104 S.Ct. at 1028-29.
66. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 389.
67. In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court invalidated under the
privileges and immunities clause a New Hampshire court rule which limited bar admission
to state residents. Although the state presented a number of cogent policy arguments to
support the rule, the Court held the rule invalid because the state failed to produce any
evidence in support of the arguments. Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 105 S.Ct.
1272, 1279 (1985).
68. Mullaney, 342 U.S. 418.
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The Wyoming court, however, unhesitatingly accepted the state's
assertion that nonresidents were9connected to the problem that the Wyoming Act attempted to remedy. Although one can argue that every construction job taken by a nonresident is one less job for a Wyoming resident, the record before the court was inadequate to support any connection between Wyoming's unemployment problem and the activity of
nonresidents. Read together, Toomer, Hicklin and United Building require
the state to present evidence showing that "the presence or activity of
nonresidents causes or exacerbates the problem the State seeks to
remedy." 70 Absent this showing it is difficult to see how the Wyoming
court ever reached the second part of the Toomer test.
The court's willingness to connect nonresidents to Wyoming's
unemployment problem on the basis of a barren record might be explained
by the importance the court attached to the fact that the Act "confines
71
its discriminatory effects to projects constructed from public funds."
Because the Act confines its discrimination to state funded projects, the
court may have reasoned that this factor was dispositive and that it was
therefore unncessary to remand for the necessary factual findings. This
reasoning finds support in United Building, where Justice Rehnquist
stated: "[T]he fact that Camden is expending its own funds ...is certainly a factor to be considered in evaluating whether the statute's discrimination violates the privileges and immunities clause."72
If this was the authority on which the court relied, then the holding
makes sense. But this reasoning still presents a major problem because
it sidesteps the dictates of Toomer. In United Building, the City of Camden
implied that a nonresident's "living off Camden without living in Camden"
was connected to Camden's economic and social decay. Despite the compelling force of this argument, the Supreme Court still found it impossible to evaluate the city's argument on the record because, as in Antonich,
no trial had been held. In sum, nothing in the record substantiated
Camden's assertion that nonresidents were in fact the evil at which the
ordinance was aimed. 3 Thus, the Wyoming court upheld the Wyoming
Preference Act by misapplying the Toomer test.
No ReasonableRelationship
Even if the state had shown that nonresidents exacerbated Wyoming's
unemployment problem, it is still doubtful whether the Wyoming
Preference Act would satisfy the second part of the Toomer test. This
part requires that there be a reasonable relationship between the Act's
69. The Wyoming court stated that "the evil which the Wyoming Preference Act combats is... a resident remaining unemployed while a nonresident takes a job on a Wyoming
public works project." Antonich, 694 P.2d at 62 (quoting State's Brief, supra note 3, at 16).
70. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 526.
71. Antonich, 694 P.2d at 63.
72. United Building, 104 S.Ct. at 1029.
73. Id at 1030.
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discrimination against nonresidents and the particular evil they
represent.14 In Hicklin, Justice Brennan implied that one may determine
this relationship by the degree to which the Act is tailored to aid the
unemployed.75 The Wyoming court apparently concluded that a reasonable
relationship existed here when it said that "the Wyoming Preference Act
specifically addresse[d] the problem of unemployment among Wyoming
construction workers."7 6 Chief Justice Thomas identified the weakness
in this reasoning when he observed that the Act did not limit the list of
available, qualified resident laborers to the unemployed.77 Because the Act
only requires the employment of laborers "who are available for
employment,""8 it can be argued that all Wyoming laborers who already
have jobs "may be drawn away from [those jobs] in order to accept what
they may regard as the more attractive opportunities thus created."7 9
The majority may have reasoned that the statute implicitly preferred
the unemployed, since only the unemployed would be available for employment. But the failure of the statutory language to limit explicitly the list
of available laborers to the unemployed is a potentially fatal defect in
Wyoming's Preference Act. The Court in Hicklin stated that Alaska Hire's
failure to limit its preference to the unemployed indicated that the statute
was not closely tailored to remedy Alaska's unemployment. The statute's
discrimination against nonresidents was therefore not substantially
related to the evil they allegedly represented. 0 The New York Court of
Appeals gave considerable attention to the same problem in Salla v.
Monroe8 when it invalidated the New York Preference Statute. The
statute's failure to mandate an explicit hiring preference for the resident
unemployed was one reason why the court concluded that the statute was
not closely tailored to alleviate New York's unemployment problem. 82
Despite the majority's statement to the contrary, therefore, the Wyoming
Act's failure to mandate an explicit preference for the resident unemployed
is a strong indication that the statute's discrimination against
nonresidents is not reasonably related to the evil they allegedly represent.
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court is the only court in recent years to sustain a resident laborers preference statute against a privileges and immunities clause challenge. In upholding the Act, the court found that the
statute satisfied the standard of review demanded by Toomer v. Witsell.
But given the scant record before the court, it is doubtful the court prop74.
75.
76.
77.

See, e.g., Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 527.
Id. at 528.
Antonich, 694 P.2d at 63.
Id. at 64 (Thomas C.J., concurring).
78. WYO. STAT. § 16-6-203 (Supp. 1985).
79. Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 523, 399 N.E.2d 909, 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d
878, 882 (1979), cert. denied, sub nom., Abrams v. Salla, 446 U.S. 909 (1980).
80. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 517, 526-28 (1978).
81. 48 N.Y.2d at 514, 399 N.E.2d at 909, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
82. Id. at 523, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
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erly applied the Toomer test. In view of the record, the court erred in failing to remand the case for further factual development in the county court.
This approach would not only have been consistent with United Building,
but it would have also produced evidence necessary to evaluate the Act
under both prongs of the Toomer test.
JOHN
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